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COMOR-D-56/16

23 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: 25X1 Targeting for [] Standby

Attached is a redraft of the [] standby paper we discussed on 22 August. It is requested that you call the office of the Chairman, COMOR prior to cob on Tuesday, 27 August, to indicate your acceptance of the paper or to suggest any minor changes. Unless major changes are involved, it is our intention to forward the paper to USIB without further referral to COMOR.

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25X1

Acting Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:
Subject draft

Copies 2, 3 State TCO
4 DIA []
5, 6, 7, 8 DIA TCO
9 OACSI TCO
10, 11 ONI TCO
12-15 AFNIN TCO
16, 17 NSA TCO
18, 19 NRO TCO
20 DIA (D/NIC)

27 Aug 1963
NSA accepts paper 0900
State - Mr. McElroy said okay 1620
Navy - Cdr. Vogt no objection 0825

subject postponed to
29 Aug COMOR mtg.

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Targeting for [] Standby

1. In February the United States Intelligence Board requested the NRO to provide a standby satellite capability for use in emergency situations for the assessment of indicators of hostile military activities on the part of the USSR against the U.S. and its Allies. The NRO has undertaken to provide a standby capability which can be launched within 7 days after notice, the first of which is expected to become available in November.

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2. The COMOR has devised a target list designed to meet the prime purpose to be programmed []. It also has procedures for updating this target list as required so that the program will be current at the moment of need and current when the film reaches NPIC. Targets which appear to be most readily responsive to the satellite collection capability and to be the likely indicators of hostile activity or intent have been selected.

3. In addition and in view of the fact that additional programming is possible, COMOR has selected certain contingency targets in other areas of the world. These are targets which could be covered without detriment to the primary mission. In a given emergency or set of circumstances indicative of hostile activity or intentions, as for example between the Soviet Union or China, orders could be issued to activate all or a part of the contingency programming in the standby. In this regard, COMOR has identified and arranged the following areas for inclusion in the programming of a standby primarily designed to cover USSR vs. U.S. and Allies situations. Such areas are, for example:

- a. Sino-Soviet border;
- b. Sino-Indian border.

4. COMOR is submitting this memorandum:

a. To advise USIB, and higher authority if the Board deems necessary, that the programming includes certain targets in addition to those considered to be most pertinent to indications of possible hostile action against the U.S. or its Allies;

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b. To point out that coverage of these other areas may be somewhat restricted by the angle of inclination considered best for the primary targets.

c. To permit USIB to advise other appropriate subcommittees of the existence, capability, and present programming of the standby. (Tab A lists the present primary targets), Tab B lists contingency targets that can be programmed with the primary) .

d. To permit USIB adequate time to direct other agencies to plan in advance for receipt and analysis of the NPIC product, in order to achieve the most rapid judgment as to the existence of indicators.

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Copy 1 DCI TCO for USIB/S
 21 TSO CIA
 22-30 Asst/OPS(NPIC)
 31 LS/PID(NPIC)
 32 TCO DDI
 33,34 CGS
 35,36 CIA Member COMOR
 37 CGS/ReqBr/ReconGrp
 38 Ch/COMOR WkgGrp
 39 AD/SI
 40 DDP TCO
 41 DDS&T
 42 AD/OSA
 43 FA/OSA
 44 Intel/OSA
 45 SO/OSA
 46 SAL/OSA
 47 - 50 SA/DDS&T

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